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Abstract
We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a gener-
alization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game
is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimal-
ity. We prove existence of ε-equilibrium situations and show that the
ε-equilibrium strategies that we have found are ε-maxmin. Conditions
under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given.
Keywords: noisy duel, payoff function, strategy, equilibrium situ-
ation, Pareto optimality, the value of a game.
1 Introduction
The classical duel is a zero-sum game of two players of the following type. The
players have certain resources and use them during a given time interval with
the goal of achieving success. Use of the resource γ at the moment t leads to
success with the probability depending on the amount of resource γ and the
time t only (it is usually assumed that the probability of success increases
with time). As soon as one player achieves the goal he receives his profit,
which is equal to his opponent’s loss, and the game ends. Various assump-
tions about the ways players use their resources and about players receiving
information about the opponent’s behavior during the game define various
kinds of duels [1, 2]. Models were considered where players’ resources were
discrete (discrete firing duels), infinitely divisible (continuous firing duels),
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continuous for one of the players and discrete for the other one (mixed du-
els, or fighter-bomber duels) [5, 6]. Researchers studied noisy duels [3, 5, 7],
where every player at a given moment of time had complete information
about his opponent’s behavior up to that moment, and silent duels, where
no such information was available. At present time duels are considered as
classical models of competition [1, 8]. However, their application as such is
somewhat limited by the assumption that the players’ interests are strictly
opposite to each other. Games of the duel type with nonzero sum belong to
an unexplored class of infinite games with nonopposite interests.
A nonzero-sum game which is a generalization of the classical antagonistic
duel was first considered in [9]; it was a nonantagonistic noisy fighter-bomber
duel. Then nonzero-sum duels were studed in [10], [11], [12].
In this paper we study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a
generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel with discrete firing [3, 4]. This
paper is an extended verion of [13] with complete proofs. It is also a sequel
to [11].
The author is grateful to Leonid Positselski for his help in translating this
paper into English and editing it.
2 Preliminaries from Game Theory
A game of two players is a quadruple
Γ = {X, Y,K1(x, y), K2(x, y)},
whereX and Y are sets of the players’ strategies andKj(x, y), j = 1, 2 are the
players’ payoff functions, which are defined on the Carthesian product X×Y
and determine the j-th player’s payoff when Player I uses a strategy x ∈ X
and Player II uses a strategy y ∈ Y . A game Γ is called a zero-sum game of
two players, or an antagonistic game if K1(x, y)+K2(x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ X ,
y ∈ Y and a nonzero-sum game of two players, or a nonantagonistic game
otherwise. Themixed extension of a game Γ is the game Γ =
(
Φ,Ψ, K(ϕ, ψ)
)
,
where Φ and Ψ are the sets of distributions on X and Y and Kj(ϕ, ψ)
(j = 1, 2) are the mean values of the payoff functions Kj(x, y) over the
distributions ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ Ψ. Pure strategies of the game Γ are distributions
concentrated in one point x ∈ X or y ∈ Y , respectively. All the other
distributions ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ Ψ are called mixed strategies.
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A situation (x, y) is a pair of the player’s strategies. A situation (xe, ye)
is called an equilibrium situation if for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y the following
inequalities hold:
K1(x, ye) 6 K1(xe, ye); K2(xe, y) 6 K2(xe, ye). (1)
The vector (v1, v2), where v1 = K1(xe, ye) and v
2 = K2(xe, ye), is called
the equilibrium value corresponding to the equilibrium situation (xe, ye), and
a strategy included in some equilibrium situation is called an equilibrium
strategy.
An infinite game with nonantagonistic interests may not admit an equi-
librium situation. A situation (xε, yε) is called an ε-equilibrium situation if
for any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y the following inequalities hold:
K1(x, y
ε)− ε 6 K1(x
ε, yε); K2(x
ε, y)− ε 6 K2(x
ε, yε). (2)
A player’s strategy included in some ε-equilibrium situation will be called an
ε-equilibrium strategy. If the limits
vj = lim
ε→0
Kj(x
ε, yε) (j = 1, 2),
exist, the vector (v1, v2) will be called the equilibrium value corresponding to
a set of ε-equilibrium situations {(xε, yε)}.
A strategy xm ∈ X is called a maxmin strategy of Player I if the function
m1(x) = inf
y∈Y
K1(x, y) attains its maximal value in it. Analogously, a strategy
ym ∈ Y is called a maxmin strategy of Player II if the function m2(y) =
inf
x∈X
K2(x, y) attains its maximal value in it. The vector
w = (w1, w2), where w1 = max
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
K1(x, y), w
2 = max
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
K2(x, y),
is called the maxmin value of a nonzero-sum game. The value wj is the best
guaranteed payoff of the j-th player.
In an infinite game maxmin strategies may not exist. In this case ε-
maxmin strategies are considered. A strategy xεm ∈ X is called an ε-maxmin
strategy of Player I if
m1(x
ε
m) > w
1 − ε, where w1 = sup
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
K1(x, y),
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and w1 is called the maxmin value of the game of Player I. Analogously one
defines an ε-maxmin strategy of Player II: a strategy yεm ∈ X is called an
ε-maxmin strategy of Player II if
m2(y
ε
m) > w
2 − ε, where w2 = sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
K2(x, y),
and w2 is called the maxmin value of the game of Player II.
If an antagonistic game admits equilibrium situations, then the equilib-
rium values corresponding to them coincide and are equal to the maxmin
value. Equilibrium strategies of an antagonistic game are maxmin and they
are called optimal, while ε-equilibrium values are ε-maxmin and they are
called ε-optimal. A nonzero-sum game may admit equilibrium situations
with unequal equilibrium values.
Let us introduce a partial order relation ≻ in R2:
a ≻ b, if aj > bj (j = 1, 2),
where at least one of the inequalities is strict. Denote by S the set of all
situations s = (x, y). The relation of Pareto preference on the set S is
defined as follows. Let si = (xi, yi) (i = 1, 2). Then
s1 ≻ s2, if K1 ≻ K2, where Ki = (K1(x
i, yi), K2(x
i, yi)), i = 1, 2. (3)
A situation sp = (xp, yp) is called Pareto-optimal if there are no situations
s = (x, y) such that s ≻ sp.
In an antagonistic game all the situations are Pareto-optimal. A game
is called quasi-antagonistic, or a game with opposite interests, if all the
situations of the game are Pareto-optimal, i. e., if for any two situations
(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ S the following conditions hold:
K1(x
1, y1) < K1(x
2, y2) ⇐⇒ K2(x
1, y1) > K1(x
2, y2));
K1(x
1, y1) = K1(x
2, y2) ⇐⇒ K2(x
1, y1) = K1(x
2, y2)). (4)
3 Posing the problem
Consider a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the
antagonistic noisy duel with discrete firing.
The players compete in the conditions of complete information. They
have discrete resources m, n ∈ N which they use during the time interval
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[0, 1]. The effectiveness of the j-th player using his resource is described
by the function Pj(t) (j = 1, 2), which defines the probability of achieving
success when using the unit of resource at the moment t. The functions
Pj(t) are continuous and increasing, Pj(0) = 0, Pj(1) = 1, 0 < Pj(t) < 1 for
t ∈ (0, 1). If one of the players achieves success, the game stops. If a player
has used all of his resource and hasn’t achieved success, the other player
postpones his action until the moment t = 1, when his probability of success
is equal to one. The profit of the j-th player in the case of his success is
equal to Aj , and his loss in the case of his opponent’s success is equal to Bj ,
where
Aj > 0, Bj > 0, Aj +Bj > 0, j = 1, 2. (5)
The players’ profits are equal to 0 if no one of them achieved success or if the
success was achieved by both of them simultaneously. A player’s strategy is a
function assigning the moment of next action to a pair of amounts of players’
current resources. Let us call the described game a noisy nonzero-sum duel
with discrete firing.
Denote by τi (0 6 τi 6 τi−1 6 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , m) the moments of time
when Player I uses his resource. Analogously, denote by ηi (0 6 ηi 6 ηi−1 6
1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n) the moments of time when Player II uses his resource.
The vectors τ and η will be called the vectors of action moments of the
players. The payoff function Kj(τ, η) is the mathematical expectation of
profit received by the j-th player in the case when the players use their
resources at the moments of time τi, ηj (i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n). It is
computed in the following way. If m = 0, n = 0, then K1 = K2 = 0. If
m > 1, n = 0, then K1 = A1, K2 = −B2. If m = 0, n > 1, then K1 = −B1,
K2 = A2. Assume that m > 1, n > 1. Set
τ ′ = (τm−1, . . . , τ1); η
′ = (ηn−1, . . . , η1).
Then
K1(τ, η) =


A1P1(τm) + (1− P1(τm))K1(τ
′, η), if τm < ηn,
A1P1(τm)(1− P2(τm))−B1(1− P1(τm))P2(τm)+
+(1− P1(τm))(1− P2(τm))K1(τ
′, η′), if τm = ηn,
−B1P2(ηn) + (1− P2(ηn))K1(τ, η
′), if τm > ηn.
(6)
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K2(τ ; η) =


A2P2(ηn) + (1− P2(ηn))K2(τ, η
′), if ηn < τm,
A2P2(τm)(1− P2(τm))− B2(1− P1(τm))P2(τm)+
+(1− P1(τm))(1− P2(τm))K2(τ
′, η′), if τm = ηn,
−B2P1(τm) + (1− P2(τm))K2(τ
′, η), if ηn > τm.
(7)
Let us denote A = (A1, A2), B = (B1, B2) and call A the profit vector and
B the loss vector of the players. Introduce the vector-function of effectiveness
P (t) = (P1(t), P2(t)). Let us denote the described game by Γmn(P,A,B) or,
for brevity, by Γmn and its mixed extension by Γmn(P,A,B) (or Γmn).
Suppose that in the duel Γmn(P,A,B) the profit and loss vectors are
related by the equation A1 = B2, A2 = B1, i. e., the profit of each player is
equal to his opponents’ loss. Then it follows from the relations (6), (7) that
K1(τ, η) = −K2(τ, η), i. e., under these conditions the game is antagonistic.
4 Situations of ε-equilibrium
Lemma 1 (Fox, Kimeldorf [3]). There exists a set {tij i, j ∈ N} such that
m∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)) +
n∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj)) = 1, (8)
and for all m,n ∈ N the following inequalities hold:
0 < tmn < min(tm−1,n, tm,n−1), where t0n = tm0 = 1.
Set
λ = min {1/(A1 +B1), 1/(A2 +B2)} /2. (9)
Choose ε > 0 and find δj (j = 1, 2) such that
tmn < δj < min(tm−1,n, tm,n−1) and Pj(δj) < Pj(tmn) + λε. (10)
Take δ = min{δ1, δ2}. Let µ, ν be the current values of the players’ resources
and ϕεµν be the uniform distribution concentrated in the interval [tµν , tµν+δ].
Define the players’ mixed strategies xε, yε in the following way. The strategy
xε (yε) prescribes to choose the next moment of action τµ (ην) in the random
way according to the distribution function ϕεµν .
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Theorem 1. The situations (xε, yε) in the game Γmn(P,A,B) are ε-equilibrium
situations. The vector vmn = (v
1
mn, v
2
mn) defined by the formulas
v1mn = A1 − (A1 +B1)
m∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)) = (A1 +B1)
n∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj))−B1;
v2mn = (A2 +B2)
m∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)−B2 = A2 − (A2 +B2)
n∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj))
(11)
is the corresponding equilibrium value.
Proof. The second equations in both lines of (11) hold by Lemma 1. Let us
obtain recurrence relations for vmn. By (11) we have:
v1m−1,n = A1 − (A1 +B1)
m−1∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)) ;
v1mn = A1 − (A1 +B1) (1− P1(tmn))
m−1∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)) =
= A1 − (1− P1(tmn)) (v
1
m−1,n − A1).
Finally we have an expression for v1mn in terms of v
1
m−1,n:
v10n = −B1 for n > 0;
v1mn = A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn)) v
1
m−1,n for m > 0, n > 0. (12)
Now obtain an expression for v1mn in terms of v
1
m,n−1. By (11) we have:
v1m,n−1 = (A1 +B1)
n−1∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj))−B1;
v1mn = (A1 +B1) (1− P2(tmn))
n−1∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj))−B1 =
= (1− P2(tmn)) (v
1
m,n−1 +B1)−B1.
Hence we get:
v1m0 = A1 for m > 0;
v1mn = −B1P2(tmn + (1− P2(tmn)) v
1
m,n−1 for m > 0, n > 0. (13)
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Analogously we deduce recurrence relations for v2mn in terms of v
2
m−1,n and
v2m,n−1:
v2m0 = −B2 for m > 0;
v2mn = A2P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn)) v
2
m,n−1 for m > 0, n > 0. (14)
v20n = A2 for n > 0;
v2mn = −B2P1(tmn + (1− P1(tmn)) v
2
m−1,n for m > 0, n > 0. (15)
To prove that (xε, yε) are ε-equilibrium situations it is necessary and
sufficient to verify the following relations:
K1(τ, y
ε) 6 K1(x
ε, yε) + ε for any τ ; (16)
K2(x
ε, η) 6 K2(x
ε, yε) + ε for any η; (17)
lim
n→∞
K1(x
ε, yε) = v1mn; (18)
lim
n→∞
K2(x
ε, yε) = v2mn. (19)
Lemma 2. For any ε > 0 there exist such strategies xε, yε that for any pure
strategies τ and η of Players I and II the following inequalities hold:
K1(τ, y
ε) < v1mn + ε; (20)
K1(x
ε, η) > v1mn − ε. (21)
Proof. For n = 0 and arbitrary m > 0 by the definition of payoff function
we have:
K1 = A1; K2 = −B2.
Analogously for m = 0 and arbitrary n > 0
K1 = −B1; K2 = A2.
By (11) we have:
v1m0 = A1; v
2
m0 = −B2; v
1
0n = −B1; v
2
0n = A2.
In both cases the inequalities (20), (21) hold.
For arbitrary m > 0, n > 0 we proceed by induction on the number of
action moments of the players. Assume that Lemma is true for all pairs (µ, ν)
for which µ 6 m, ν 6 n, (µ, ν) 6= (m,n) and prove it for (µ, ν) = (m,n).
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Every pure strategy of Player I has the following structure. Let t ∈ [0, 1]
denote the planned moment of his first action. If Player II acts and misses at
a time ηn < t, then Player I follows a pure strategy τ
1 in Γm,n−1. If Player II
does not act before the time t then Player I acts at the time t, and unless
Player II also acts at the time t, Player I after that adopts a pure strategy
τ 2 in Γm−1,n.
Every pure strategy of Player II has the similar structure. Let u ∈ [0, 1]
denote the planned moment of his first action. If Player I acts and misses at
a time τm < u, then Player II follows a pure strategy η
1 in Γm−1,n. If Player I
does not act before the time u then Player II acts at the time u, and unless
Player I also acts at the time u, Player II after that adopts a pure strategy
η2 in Γm,n−1.
The strategy yε of Player II is constructed as follows. Fix ε > 0. Choose
t randomly according to ϕεmn. If Player I does not act before the time t, then
Player II acts at the time ηn = t and, unless Player I also acts at the time t,
then adopts the strategy y1,ε in Γm,n−1. If Player I acts and misses at the time
τm < u, then Player II adopts the strategy y
2,ε in Γm−1,n. Accoding to the
inductive assumption, we choose y1,ε, y2,ε such that for any pure strategies
τ 1 and τ 2 of Player I the following inequalities hold:
K1(τ
1, y1,ε) < v1m,n−1 + ε/2 (22)
K1(τ
2, y2,ε) < v1m−1,n + ε/2 (23)
The strategy xε of Player I is constructed similarly. Choose u randomly
according to ϕεmn. If Player II does not act before the time u, then Player II
acts at the time ηn = u and, unless Player II also acts at the time u, adopts
the strategy x1,ε in Γm−1,n. If Player II acts and misses at the time τm < u,
then Player I adopts the strategy x2,ε in Γm,n−1. Accoding to the inductive
assumption, we choose x1,ε, x2,ε such that for any pure strategies η1 and η2
of Player II the following inequalities hold:
K1(x
1,ε, η1) > v1m−1,n − ε/2 (24)
K1(x
2,ε, η2) > v1m,n−1 − ε/2 (25)
For all strategies described above we have ignored the response to simultane-
ous actions of players since this event has probability 0 when Player I adopts
xε or Player II adopts yε.
Let us prove the inequality (20).
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Note that by the definition of payoff function for any strategies x, y we
have:
−Bj 6 Kj(x, y) 6 Aj (j = 1, 2) =⇒
Kj(x, y) +Bj > 0; (26)
Aj −Kj(x, y) > 0. (27)
Let τ be an arbitrary pure strategy of Player I and t be the time of first
action in τ . There are three cases to be considered.
1. Suppose t ∈ [0, tmn]. In this case Player I always acts first; so
K1(τ, y
ε) = A1P1(t) + (1− P1(t))K1(τ
2, y2,ε). (28)
One can see from the inequality (27) that the right hand side of (28)
does not exceed
(A1 −K1(τ
2, y2,ε))P1(tmn) +K1(τ
2, y2,ε) =
= A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))K1(τ
2, y2,ε).
According to (23), the latter expression is less than
A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))(vm−1,n + ε/2).
Using the recurrence relation (12) we get:
A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))(vm−1,n + ε/2) = vmn + (1− P1(tmn))ε.
Therefore
K1(τ, y
ε) < vmn + ε.
2. Suppose t ∈ (tmn, tmn + δ). In this case either player may act first; so
K1(τ, y
ε) =
t∫
tmn
(−B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ))K1(τ
1, y1,ε))dϕεmn(ξ)+
+
tmn+δ∫
t
(A1P1(ξ) + (1− P1(ξ))K1(τ
2, y2,ε))dϕεmn(ξ).
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Estimate the first integrand using the relations (26), (22), and (13):
− B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ))K1(τ
1, y1,ε) =
= K1(τ
1, y1,ε)− P2(ξ)(K1(τ
1, y1,ε) +B1) 6
6 K1(τ
1, y1,ε)− P2(tmn)(K1(τ
1, y1,ε) +B1) =
− B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))K1(τ
1, y1,ε) 6
6 −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))(vm,n−1 + ε/2) =
= vmn + (1− P2(tmn))ε/2 < vmn + ε.
Estimate the second integrand using the relations (27), (26), (9), (10),
and (12):
A1P1(ξ) + (1− P1(ξ))K1(τ
2, y2,ε) =
= (A1 −K1(τ
2, y2,ε))P1(ξ) +K1(τ
2, y2,ε) 6
6 (A1 −K1(τ
2, y2,ε))(P1(tmn) + λε) +K1(τ
2, y2,ε) 6
6 A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))K1(τ
2, y2,ε) + (A1 +B1)λε 6
6 A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))(vm−1,n + ε/2) + ε/2 =
= vmn + (1− P2(tmn))ε/2 + ε/2 < vmn + ε.
After integrating we get:
K1(τ, y
ε) < vmn + ε.
3. Suppose t ∈ [tmn + δ, 1]. In this case Player II always acts first; so
K1(τ, y
ε) =
tmn+δ∫
tmn
(−B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ))K1(τ
1, y1,ε))dϕεmn(ξ).
Estimate the integrand using the relations (26), (22), (13):
−B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ)K1(τ
1, y1,ε) =
= K1(τ
1, y1,ε)− (K1(τ
1, y1,ε) +B1)P2(ξ) 6
6 K1(τ
1, y1,ε)− (K1(τ
1, y1,ε) +B1)P2(tmn) =
= −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))K1(τ
1, y1,ε) 6
6 −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))(vm,n−1 + ε/2) < vmn + ε.
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After integrating we have:
K1(τ, y
ε) < vmn + ε.
Hence the inequality (20) is proved.
Now let us turn to the inequality (21). Let η be an arbitrary pure strategy
of Player II and u = ηn be the first action time in η.
There are three cases to be considered.
1. Suppose u ∈ [0, tmn]. In this case Player II acts first; so
K1(x
ε, η) = −B1P2(u) + (1− P2(u))K1(x
2,ε, η2).
By the relations (26), (22), and (13), we have:
K1(x
ε, η) =K1(x
2,ε, η2)− (B1 +K1(x
2,ε, η2))P2(u) >
> K1(x
2,ε, η2) + (B1 +K1(x
2,ε, η2))P2(tmn) =
= −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))K1(x
2,ε, η2) >
> −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))(vm,n−1 − ε/2) =
= vmn − (1− P1(tmn))ε/2 > vmn − ε.
2. Suppose u ∈ (tmn, tmn + δ). In this case either player may act first; so
K1(x
ε, η) =
∫ u
tmn
(A1P1(ξ) + (1− P1(ξ))K1(x
2,ε, η2))dϕεmn(ξ)+
+
∫ tmn+δ
u
(−B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ))K1(x
1,ε, η1))dϕεmn(ξ).
Estimate the first integrand using the relations (27), (25), and (12):
A1P1(ξ) + (1− P1(ξ))K1(x
2,ε, η2) =
= (A1 −K1(x
2,ε, η2))P1(ξ) +K1(x
2,ε, η2) >
> (A1 −K1(x
2,ε, η2))P1(tmn) +K1(x
2,ε, η2) =
= A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))K1(x
2,ε, η2) >
> A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))(vm−1,n − ε/2) =
= vmn − (1− P2(tmn))ε > vmn − ε.
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Estimate the second integrand using the relations (26), (27), (9), (10),
and (13):
− B1P2(ξ) + (1− P2(ξ))K1(x
1,ε, η1) =
= K1(x
1,ε, η1)− P2(ξ)(K1(x
1,ε), η1) +B1) >
> K1(τ
1, y1,ε)− (P2(tmn) + λε)(K1(x
1,ε, η1) +B1) >
> −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))K1(x
1,ε, η1)− (A1 +B1)λε >
> −B1P2(tmn) + (1− P2(tmn))(vm,n−1 − ε/2)− ε/2) =
= vmn − (1− P2(tmn))ε/2− ε/2 > vmn − ε.
After integrating we get:
K1(τ, y
ε) > vmn − ε.
3. Suppose u ∈ [tmn + δ, 1]. In this case Player I acts first; so
K1(x
ε, η) =
tmn+δ∫
tmn
(A1P1(ξ) + (1− P1(ξ))K1(x
1,ε, η1))dϕεmn(ξ).
By the relations (27), (22), and (12), we have:
K1(x
ε, η) =
tmn+δ∫
tmn
((A1 −K1(x
1,ε, η1))P1(ξ) +K1(x
1,ε, η1))dϕεmn(ξ) >
>
tmn+δ∫
tmn
((A1 −K1(x
1,ε, η1))P1(tmn) +K1(x
1,ε, η1))dϕεmn(ξ) =
= A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))K1(x
1,ε, η1) >
> A1P1(tmn) + (1− P1(tmn))(vm−1,n − ε/2) =
= vmn − (1− P1(tmn)ε/2 > vmn − ε/2.
Hence the inequality (21) is proved. ✷
Let us continue to prove the theorem. Choose ε > 0. By Lemma 2, we
can find a strategy yε, satisfying (20) for any pure strategy τ of Player I.
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From the inequality (20) it follows that
K1(x, y
ε) < v1mn + ε (29)
for any mixed strategy x of Player I. In particular for x = xε we have:
K1(x
ε, yε) < v1mn + ε =⇒ v
1
mn > K1(x
ε, yε)− ε. (30)
From the inequality (21) it follows that
K1(x
ε, y) > v1mn − ε (31)
for any mixed strategy y of Player II. In particular for y = yε we have:
K1(x
ε, yε) > v1mn − ε =⇒ v
1
mn < K1(x
ε, yε) + ε. (32)
Taking in account the relations (29), (32) we obtain
K1(x, y
ε) < v1mn + ε < K1(x
ε, yε) + ε
for any mixed strategy x of Player I. Hence inequality (16) is proved. The
relation (18) follows from (30) and (32).
Due to the symmetry of the setting the relations (17), (19) are proved by
the same arguments that (16), (18). ✷
Theorem 2. The maxmin value of the game Γmn(P,A,B) coincides with
the equilibrium value vmn. The ε-equilibrium strategies x
ε, yε are ε-maxmin
strategies.
Proof. Let us use the properties of the zero-sum duel Γmn(P,C, C), where
C1 = A1, C2 = B1, C = (C2, C1). In an antagonistic game the equilibrium
value coincides with the maxmin value and ε-equilibrium strategies are ε-
maxmin strategies. As the equilibrium value of Γmn(P,C, C) is equal to
v1mn [4], so the maxmin value of this game is also equal to v
1
mn and the
ε-equilibrium strategy xε of Player I is his ε-maxmin strategy. Thus the
maxmin value of the game Γmn(P,A,B) for Player I is equal to v
1
mn, and x
ε
is his ε-maxmin strategy.
The statement of the theorem for Player II follows from the symmetry of
the setting. ✷
14
5 Pareto-optimal plays
The pair p = (τ, η) of vectors of action moments realized during the game is
called a play. Let us denote the set of all plays of a noisy duel Γmn(P,A,B)
by P. Note that P is a subset of the set of all situations of the corresponding
silent duel (with the same effectivess functions, resources, and vectors of
profit and loss). Namely, P includes exactly those situations of the silent
duel in which after one of the players has used all of his resource, the other
one postpones his action until the moment t = 1. A play p1 ∈ P is called
Pareto-optimal if there exist no p2 ∈ P such that p2 ≻ p1. Plays p1 and
p2 are called incomparable if p1 ⊁ p2 and p2 ⊁ p1. Plays p1 = (τ 1, η1) and
p2 = (τ 2, η2) are called equivalent if Kj(τ
1, η1) = Kj(τ
2, η2) (j = 1, 2).
A play p = (τ, η) ∈ P is called a T -play if for any k, l (1 6 k 6 m;
1 6 l 6 n) at least one of the following two equations holds
τk = tkl; ηl = tkl,
where k, l are the current resources of the players.
Lemma 3. Let pT = (τT , ηT ) be an arbitrary T -play with noncoinciding
action moments of the players, i. e., τk 6= ηl for all k (1 6 k 6 m), l (1 6
l 6 n). Then
K1(τ
T , ηT ) = v1mn; K2(τ
T , ηT ) = v2mn. (33)
Proof. Let us prove Lemma by induction on the number of action moments
of the players. For n = 0, m > 0 or m = 0, n > 0 the assertion is true as
v1m0 = A1; v
2
m0 = −B2, v
1
0n = −B1; v
2
0n = A2. Assume that the statement is
true for all pairs (k, l) such that k 6 m; l 6 n; k + l < m + n and prove it
for (k, l) = (m,n). Suppose that Player I acts at the moment t = tmn. Then
using the recursive formula (6) for τm < ηn and the inductive assumptions
we obtain
K1(τ, η) = A1P1(tmn)− (1− P1(tmn))
(
A1 − (A1 +B1)
m−1∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin))
)
=
= A1 − (A1 +B1)
m∏
i=1
(1− P1(tin)) = v
1
mn.
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Suppose that Player II acts at the moment of time tmn. Then using the
formula (6) for τm > ηn and the inductive assumptions we obtain
K1(τ, η) = −B1P2(tmn)− (1− P2(tmn))
(
(A1 +B1)
n−1∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj))− B1
)
=
= −B1 + (A1 +B1)
n∏
j=1
(1− P2(tmj)) = v
1
mn.
The second player’s payoff fuction is considered in the analogous way. ✷
Lemma 4. Let the plays p1 = (τ 1, η1), p2 = (τ 2, η2) ∈ P satisfy the condi-
tions
η1i = η
2
i , τ
1
i = τ
2
i for i > 2; (34)
τ 11 = t11; η
1
2 < t11; η
1
1 = 1; τ
2
1 = t11; η
2
1 = t11. (35)
Then we have (1) if A ≻ B, then p1 ≻ p2; (2) if B ≻ A, then p2 ≻ p1.
Proof. Express the payoff function of the plays p1 and p2 in the following
way:
K1(τ
1, η1) = K1(τm, . . . τ2; ηn, . . . η2) +
m∏
i=2
(1− P1(τi))×
×
n∏
j=2
(1− P2(ηj)) (A1P1(t11)− B1 (1− P1(t11))) ;
K1(τ
2, η2) = K1(τm, . . . τ2; ηn, . . . η2) +
m∏
i=2
(1− P1(τi))×
×
n∏
j=2
(1− P2(ηj)) (A1P1(t11) (1− P2(t11))− B1 (1− P1(t11))P2(t11)) .
Consider the difference K1(τ
1, η1) − K1(τ
2, η2). Taking in account that by
Lemma 1
P1(t11) + P2(t11) = 1,
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we have:
K1(τ
1, η1)−K1(τ
2, η2) =
= (A1 −B1)P1(t11)P2(t11)
m∏
i=2
(1− P1(τi))
n∏
j=2
(1− P2(ηj)) . (36)
Analogously,
K2(τ
1, η1)−K2(τ
2, η2) =
= (A2 −B2)P1(t11)P2(t11)
m∏
i=2
(1− P1(τi))
n∏
j=2
(1− P2(ηj)) . (37)
The statement of Lemma follows from (36), (37). ✷
A duel may have one of four alternative results: H0 — no one of players
achieves success; H1 — Player I achieves success; H2 — Player II achieves
success; H3 — both players achieve success simultaneously. We denote the
probability of the result Hi in play (τ, η) by Qi(τ, η) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3). Then:
3∑
i=0
Qi(τ, η) = 1. (38)
Success of both players is possible only if they act simultaneously, because if
one of the players achieves success, the game stops. As the payoff function
Kj(τ ; η) is the mathematical expectation of profit, so
K1(τ ; η) = A1Q1(τ, η)− B1Q2(τ, η); (39)
K2(τ ; η) = A2Q2(τ, η)− B2Q1(τ, η). (40)
By (38), we have:
K1(α, β) = A1 − (A1 +B1)Q2(α, β)− A1(Q0(α, β) +Q3(α, β)); (41)
K2(α; β) = −B2 + (A2 +B2)Q2(α, β) +B2(Q0(α, β) +Q3(α, β)). (42)
Denote by P ′ ⊂ P the set of plays with noncoinsiding action times in
which τ1 = 1 or η1 = 1. The complement P \ P
′ includes plays in which the
players use their last units of resource simultaneously.
Lemma 5. Let p′ = (τ ′, η′) ∈ P ′ and p = (τ, η) ∈ P \ P ′. In this case
(1) if p′ ≻ p, then A1A2 > B1B2; (2) if p ≻ p
′, then A1A2 < B1B2.
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Proof. Let (τ ′, η′) ∈ P ′, so the relations (41), (42) reduce to the form:
K1(τ
′, η′) = A1 − (A1 +B1)Q2(τ
′, η′); (43)
K2(τ
′, η′) = −B2 + (A2 +B2)Q2(τ
′, η′). (44)
Consider the differences ∆j = Kj(τ, η) − Kj(τ
′, η′). Applying the formu-
las (41), (42), (43), (44) we get:
∆1 = (A1 +B1)I(τ
′, η′; τ, η)− A1Q(τ, η); (45)
∆2 = −(A2 +B2)I(τ
′, η′; τ, η) +B2Q(τ, η). (46)
where
I(τ ′, η′; τ, η) = Q2(τ
′, η′)−Q2(τ, η);
Q(τ ′, η′) = Q0(τ
′, η′) +Q3(τ
′, η′).
Let us prove the first assertion of Lemma. If p′ ≻ p, then ∆1 6 0, ∆2 6 0
and at least one of this inequalities is strict. Since Aj +Bj > 0 (j = 1, 2), it
follows from (45), (46) that
I(τ ′, η′; τ, η) 6
A1
A1 +B1
Q(τ, η); (47)
I(τ ′, η′; τ, η) >
B2
A2 +B2
Q(τ, η). (48)
Since Q(τ, η) 6= 0 for p = (τ, η) ∈ P \ P ′, combining the inequalities (47),
(48) and taking in account that at least one of them is strict, we get:
B2
A2 +B2
<
A1
A1 +B1
=⇒ A1A2 > B1B2.
The second statement of the lemma is proved in the analogous way. ✷
Lemma 6. Let p1, p2 ∈ P
′. Then p1 and p2 are Pareto-incomparable.
Proof. If p = (τ, η) ∈ P ′, then from the relations (43), (44) it follows that:
K2(α, β) =
A1A2 − B1B2
A1 +B1
−
A2 +B2
A1 +B1
K1(α, β). (49)
The statement of Lemma immediately follows from (49). ✷
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Theorem 3. If in the game Γmn(P,A,B) the coefficients of profit and loss
of the players satisfy the condition
A1A2 = B1B2, (50)
then the game is quasi-antagonistic.
In the paper [12] a similar theorem about a sufficient condition of quasi-
antagonisticity was also proven for continuous and discrete duels.
Proof. Note that if the relation (50) holds, then there exists a number λ > 0
such that
K1(τ, η) = −λK2(τ, η). (51)
Indeed, suppose A1A2 > 0. Then accoding to (50) B1B2 > 0 and A1/B2 =
B1/A2. In this case from the formulas (39), (40) one can see that (51) holds
with λ = A1/B2. Suppose that one of the numbers A1 or A2 is equal to
zero. If A1 = 0, then by (5) we have B1 6= 0, and from (50) it follows
B2 = 0, A2 6= 0. Then in view of the relations (39), (40) we conclude that
the equation (51) holds with λ = B1/A2. The case A2 = 0 is considered
in the similar way. So it is proved that there exists λ > 0 for which the
equation (51) holds. It follows from (51) that the game is quasi-antagonistic.
✷
Theorem 4. If the coefficients of profit and loss of the players are related
by the inequality A1A2 > B1B2, then T -plays with noncoinciding action mo-
ments of the players are Pareto-optimal.
Proof. If A1A2 = B1B2, then by Theorem 3 all plays are Pareto-optimal.
In any T -play with noncoinciding action moments the last action of a player
happens at t = 1, i. e., max{τ1, η1} = 1. Suppose A1A2 > B1B2. We will
show that p ⊁ p′ for any plays p ∈ P, p′ ∈ P ′. There are two cases to be
considered.
1. p ∈ P ′. Then by Lemma 6 p ⊁ p′.
2. p ∈ P \P ′. By Lemma 5, if p ≻ p′ then A1A2 < B1B2 in contradiction
to the assumption of the theorem. Therefore p ⊁ p′.
✷
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Theorem 5. If B ≻ A, then T -plays with noncoinciding action moments of
the players are not Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Since according to Lemma 3 all the T -plays with noncoinciding
action moments of the players are equivalent, we will give the proof for one
T -play only, namely for the play p1 = (τ, η) in which
τi = ti1 for i = 1, . . . , m;
ηj = tmj for j = 2, . . . , n; η1 = 1.
Set
p2 = (τ, η2), where η2 = (t11, η2, . . . , ηn).
The plays p1, p2 satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4, therefore
B ≻ A =⇒ p2 ≻ p1.
Thus the T -play p1 and all the other T -plays with noncoinciding action mo-
ments of the players are not Pareto-optimal. ✷
Theorem 6. If the duel Γmn(P,A,B) is quasi-antagonistic, then one of the
following two conditions holds:
(1) (A1 − B1)(A2 −B2) < 0; (2) Aj = Bj ; j = 1, 2. (52)
Proof. Assume that the plays p1, p2 satisfy the conditions (34), (35). Sup-
pose that no one of the conditions (52) holds. Then the following two cases
are possible.
1. A ≻ B. Then according to the statement (1) of Lemma 4 one has
p1 ≻ p2. Therefore the play p2 is not Pareto-optimal, and so the game
is not quasi-antagonistic.
2. B ≻ A. Then according to the statement (2) of Lemma 4 one has
p2 ≻ p1. Therefore the play p1 is not Pareto-optimal, and so the game
is not quasi-antagonistic.
✷
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